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In the short time allotted, I will limit my comments on
this wide-ranging paper to Professor Michael Graetz's critique
of concepts and principles developed in my own work. I am
flattered by his assertion that my early work in the 1960s has
been a strong and lasting influence on subsequent work on in-
ternational taxation, and only can add that I wish it were so.
He then suggests that those principles and concepts which I
advanced at that time and the policies which flow from them
are now outdated and need considerable rethinking.
I should first point out that my own thinking also has
evolved over the 40 year period since I broke new ground in
the application of economic analysis to the subject, and my
paper in this session is a condensation of where that evolving
thought has led me.1
Professor Graetz points out that times and circumstances
have changed, invalidating pursuit of the standard of capital
export neutrality via taxation of worldwide income together
with the foreign tax credit (FTC). He thus rejects the notion
that U.S. policy should support efficiency in the international
allocation of capital and thus the maximization of worldwide
welfare, instead suggesting that policy should be focused on
national self-interest. I have never argued that worldwide
welfare should be the sole consideration in tax policy, and as
my paper at this Symposium indicates, the foreign tax credit
represents a considerable revenue sacrifice by the U.S. in the
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interests of an orderly and efficient international tax system.
While it well may be true that present-day circumstances
make implementation of the FTC more complex, so long as
there are significant differences in corporate tax rates among
countries, it remains a valid construct and its adoption should
be seen as a cornerstone of a .cooperative world tax order.
It is not clear to me what tax regime Professor Graetz
would substitute for the FTC if tax policy is to promote the
national rather than international interest. In his summary he
suggests that the FTC should be abandoned where the host
country's rate is similar to that of the U.S. Of course I agree
with that, for there is no point in imposing administrative and
compliance costs where little or no revenue is involved and
little neutrality is lost. But it is important to emphasize that a
blanket exemption for foreign income promotes tax competition
abroad while the FTC acts as a protection against tax competi-
tion. While public choice economists have been writing on
behalf of tax competition as a means of curbing the growth of
government, I do not share that view, believing it can develop
into a destructive "race to the bottom," an important feature
especially for developing countries with strong need for govern-
ment-financed infrastructure. It also should be noted that tax
neutrality for foreign investment achieved through use of the
FTC need not be incompatible with standards of tax equity for
the income tax as it applies to individual shareholders.
Professor Graetz also rejects substitution of the foreign tax
deduction (FTD) for the FTC system. Nearly 40 years ago I
suggested the FTD as a means of maximizing the national
gains from foreign investment and in recent years others have
suggested FTD as a protectionist device in the national inter-
est. In this regard, I strongly have been critical of the general
practice at the policy-making level of putting free capital move-
ment and free trade in goods and services in the same basket.
Foreign investment involves a transfer abroad of productive
resources whereas free trade promotes the most productive use
of existing national resources. Transfer of capital abroad has
strong distributional implications both for domestic income
groups and between nations, an important aspect that is not
mentioned by the author. Where national self-interest may
well support freb trade, it does not necessarily support free
capital movement, whether in the form of direct or portfolio
investment. I believe that a country has a right to deter the
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loss of its national savings, just as it has the right to protect
itself from unfettered immigration. A tax policy, such as the
FTD, which acts as some deterrent to capital outflow, is an
appropriate option which should be on the table. Furthermore,
FTD would represent great simplification of the present FTC
regime.
While Professor Graetz appears to support source-based
taxation, he rejects the concept of capital import neutrality
(CIN) as its justification, but without exactly explaining why. I
also reject CIN as a normative concept for there seems no good
economic reason why capital which emanates from different
countries should be taxed at the same source rate. The only
neutrality that is economically meaningful is CEN. Horizontal
equity and the integrity of each home country's tax system
calls for inclusion of foreign income in the tax base. True,
source country taxation alone, implying exemption by the home
country, also may result in a larger share of foreign invest-
ment for those countries with above-average tax rates than
would a FTC approach, but this result carries no normative
value, and I am skeptical of Professor Graetz's support for
larger market share.
Professor Graetz does not appear to embrace the idea of
worldwide cooperation in international taxation, except for the
exchange of information which I also enthusiastically endorse.
But I go beyond this purpose to say that cooperation is essen-
tial to achieve inter-nation equity about which Professor
Graetz has little to say. Inter-nation equity, as my own paper
indicates, is a standard applicable to countries of source and
involves the concepts of a fair division of tax base and reciproc-
ity of tax rates. I also should add that the withholding tax is
an integral part of each source country's effective tax rate and
as such should play an important role in the attainment of
inter-nation equity. Beyond that, cooperation is needed if a
neutral tax regime for foreign investment is sought, i.e. to
promote internatiohal efficiency (as opposed to national effi-
ciency) in the allocation of investment, analogously to free
trade agreements. Indeed, a "comprehensive review" of the
taxation of foreign investment which Professor Graetz calls for,
leads me in an opposite direction from where he seems to
point. I am increasingly of the opinion that some kind of inter-
nationalization of the corporation income tax is needed as the
taxation of foreign income by individual countries becomes ever
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more complex and investors' capacity to evade that taxation
ever greater. Such a move need not interfere with the equity of
each country's individual income tax differences in which it
(including the degree of integration of the corporation tax)
could coexist with a uniform rate of corporation tax.
Finally, Professor Graetz briefly advocates introduction of
a destination-type value-added tax in the U.S. to allow a near
abolition of the individual income tax. I am disturbed by the
taxpayer equity implications of such a move. If applied unilat-
erally, it would result in massive non-neutralities as invest-
ment from abroad would receive a strong tax incentive to in-
vest in the U.S. I have written extensively on this subject so I
will not say more. In any case, I think Professor Graetz would
agree with me that tax policy for foreign investment needs to
be given the same international consideration as has been
given to tariffs and other policies with regard to trade. For
that to happen, there must be a separation of the two, with
pursuit of free trade no longer necessarily calling for unimped-
ed capital movements.
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